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CObjectives: In light of the current debate on the use value and po-
tential impact of comparative effectiveness research on patient ac-
cess, it may prove insightful to compare a health-care system that
systematically bases its reimbursement decisions on comparative
effectiveness evidence with the United States (US) system that hith-
erto has only been informed by such evidence on an ad hoc basis.
Methods: For a set of 2000 –2009 approved new molecular entities
and biologics indicated for cancer, we compared patient access be-
tween US Medicare and Australian Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme
(PBS) beneficiaries. Here, access is defined in terms of marketing
availability, payer coverage, and patient out-of-pocket costs.
Results: Although 34 drugs and biologics were approved for cancer
in the US, just more than one-third (35%) were ultimately covered by O
tudy
al So
doi:10.1016/j.jval.2011.05.004he Australian PBS. The PBS also placed more restrictions on use. On
he other hand, prices and patient out-of-pocket costs were greater
or the US Medicare population. Conclusion: Our analysis points to a
ossible trade-off in market access to oncology drugs. Although
ore oncology drugs are available in the US and a higher percentage
f available drugs are covered, the evidence-based approach ad-
pted by Australia has contributed to reduced prices, thereby im-
roving affordability for payers and patients for those medications
eemed cost-effective by the reimbursement authority.
eywords: United States, Australia, access to health care, pharmaceu-
icals, cancer.
opyright © 2011, International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and
utcomes Research (ISPOR). Published by Elsevier Inc.Introduction
In the United States (US), patient access to costly new cancer drugs is of
keen interest and concern to patients, physicians, payers, developers,
and policymakers. Because many newly approved cancer drugs have
high per-unit prices, licensing by the regulatory authority is not suffi-
cient to ensure population-wide access. New cancer treatments have
been a focal point in the ongoing public debate on the merits of costly
treatments that are perceived as offering relatively modest benefits [1].
The US Congressional Budget Office has defined comparative
effectiveness research (CER) as “a rigorous evaluation of the im-
pact of different treatment options that are available for treating a
given medical condition for a particular set of patients” [2]. The
goal of CER is to provide decision makers—patients, physicians,
and payers—with clinical evidence to support treatment and cov-
erage decisions. With few exceptions, payers have been reluctant
to explicitly assess the comparative (cost) effectiveness of drugs
and make reimbursement decisions accordingly [3,4].
There appears to be consensus on the need for an improved evi-
dence base through CER. The extent to which there is agreement on
CER,however,seemstoendhere.There isnoconsensusregardingwhat
kind of impact CER should have on treatment and coverage decisions.
This normative debate pits two opposing camps on either side of the
philosophical divide. On the one hand, some maintain that treatment
and coverage decisions, particularly with regard to expensive drugs,
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Published by Elsevier Inc.should be subject to explicit cost-effectiveness considerations, includ-
ingtheuseofthresholds,becausethispresumablyconstitutesarational
way to contain cost growth [5]. Others, however, resist this notion, ar-
guing that such thresholds are an ineffective way to contain costs. Fur-
ther, they see thresholds as an impediment to innovation [6].
To inform the CER debate, we examined the Australian reim-
bursement decision-making process, which makes its resource al-
location decisions explicit and evidence based. In this study, we
compare patient access to newly approved cancer medications in
the US and Australia. Broadly, our goals in this article are to 1)
compare the Australian method of priority setting, which has built
up an extensive evidence base and systematically uses CER evi-
dence to guide treatment and coverage decisions, to the US system
that until now gathers and implements CER evidence on an ad hoc
basis and 2) examine the impact that systematic use of CER ap-
pears to have on patient access to cancer drugs approved from
2000 through 2009 in the US and Australia.
We recognize the inherent challenge of comparing different
health-care systems. In all international comparisons, including
the one presented here, one should continually be mindful of the
political, social, and economic forces that shape policy outcomes.
For example, the US and Australian health-care systems differ
substantially in terms of regulatory processes and government
involvement. Nonetheless, macro-level comparisons with respect
to multiple health policy questions are conducted by researchers
of Drug Development, Tufts University, 75 Kneeland Street, Suite
ciety for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR).
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vastly different health-care systems [7–10].
US Health Technology Assessment (HTA) and reimbursement
We assume that the reader is familiar with the general contours of
the US system. Suffice it to say, the US system reflects a great
diversity of pricing and reimbursement mechanisms, in both the
private and public sectors. Each US payer uses its own method for
evaluating newly approved biopharmaceuticals, some with more
evidence-based methods than others. Although many now appear
to use cost-effectiveness in their formulary decisions, evidence sug-
gests that it remains a secondary criterion at best [11]. Furthermore,
public payers (i.e., Medicare and Medicaid) are legislatively barred
from considering cost or cost-effectiveness [12]. Overall, until now,
HTA has remained largely an academic exercise, with little impact on
payer decisions, particularly at the national level [3]. Lack of system-
atization and standardization, widespread differences in organiza-
tional structure, a myriad of state and federal laws, and market com-
petition all contribute to significant variation in payer policies,
which, in turn, lead to variable levels of patient access.
Australian HTA and reimbursement
Health care in Australia is largely a public system [13,14]. The fed-
eral government operates a comprehensive national prescription
drug reimbursement program known as the Pharmaceutical Ben-
efits Scheme (PBS). Prescription drug coverage is provided to all
residents and visitors through the PBS, which accounts for approx-
imately 80% of all prescriptions [15,16]. In recent years, spending
in Australia on cancer drugs has grown significantly. Since 2000,
growth in expenditures on antineoplastic and immunomodulat-
ing agents has averaged over 20% annually [17].
A sponsor seeking PBS listing for a newly developed product
must first obtain marketing approval from the Therapeutic Goods
Administration (TGA), the Australian analogue to the US Food and
Drug Administration (FDA). Once the product is registered, the
sponsor must submit an application for funding consideration to
the Pharmaceutical Benefit Advisory Committee (PBAC), an inde-
pendent body tasked with making recommendations to the Health
Minister about whether a drug should be reimbursed by the PBS. In
making its recommendations, the PBAC considers several factors,
including clinical need and comparative cost-effectiveness. There
is a strong preference for randomized, controlled clinical trials
that directly compare a newly approved drug to a comparator.
Here, the choice of an existing treatment to which the new drug
will be compared is critical. The most prescribed analogue used for
the same indication is usually preferred. For example, if the drug is
in a new pharmacological class, the drug most prescribed in the
PBS for the same indication is the comparator. Alternatively, if no
currently listed drug is available, the main comparator is usually
standard nondrug treatment [16].
The PBAC does not adhere to fixed cost-effectiveness thresh-
olds. Rather, a drug’s cost-effectiveness is considered in combina-
tion with other factors, such as availability of alternative thera-
pies, disease severity, and projected budget impact. For example, a
higher cost-effectiveness ratio could be acceptable when the drug
is indicated for a life-threatening condition, when there are no
alternative therapies available, or when a rare disease is involved,
in which case, the financial consequences of prescribing and re-
imbursing the drug for all eligible patients are limited.
Under the PBS, products fall into four categories as recommended
by the PBAC: unrestricted, restricted, authority required, and denied
coverage. Unrestricted means all TGA-approved indications are re-
imbursed. When evidence fails to show adequate cost-effectiveness
or there are issues raised on other grounds, such as a high degree of
uncertainty regarding cost-effectiveness or budget impact, a drug
may be listed as restricted or authority required [15]. Restricted list-ings are generally limited to particular therapeutic uses, populations
(e.g., pediatrics), or clinical settings. Drugs tagged with authority re-
quired are restricted to specific therapeutic uses and require previous
PBS approval, which can be contingent on specific initiation rules,
such as diagnostic tests or evidence of response (or lack thereof) to
previous treatments [18]. In some cases, there are also criteria placed
on the conditions for which continuation of an authority-required
treatment is justified. In addition, listings may be subject to quantity
limits depending on the indication.
Finally, the PBAC can reject a drug outright or defer issuing a
final recommendation on a drug. A refusal to recommend effec-
tively denies listing in the PBS, although sponsors can have appli-
cations reconsidered if new evidence is provided [9]. Deferrals re-
quire sponsors to clarify or provide additional data or information
before the PBAC is able to make a fully informed recommendation.
If a positive recommendation is given, the decision is passed on
to the Pharmaceutical Benefit Pricing Authority (PBPA). Similar to
PBAC, the PBPA provides guidance to the Minister of Health and
Ageing, specifically with respect to the price of drugs. In negotiat-
ing prices with the manufacturer, the PBPA explicitly considers
clinical and cost-effectiveness. In this respect, pricing is partly
value based; that is, it is adjusted in accordance with a drug’s
cost-effectiveness ratio. In addition, the PBPA considers prices of
alternative brands and similar products in the relevant therapeu-
tic group and expected use [16].
The final decision to list a drug in the PBS is made by the Min-
ister of Health based on the recommendations from the PBAC and
PBPA. Products not receiving a positive recommendation from the
PBAC cannot be approved by the Minister. For drugs expected to af-
fect the health or pharmaceutical budget by more than $10 million,
the decision must be made at the cabinet level. All drugs receiving
final approval by the Minister are published in a publicly available
formulary called the Schedule of Pharmaceutical Benefits (hereafter
referred to as Schedule of Benefits). The Schedule of Benefits serves
as a positive list, meaning only listed products are subsidized.
Prescriptions under the PBS in Australia are subject to out-of-
pocket cost sharing via fixed copayments per prescription. For
general beneficiaries, the maximum amount is AU$33.30
(US$31.00), whereas other concessional beneficiaries (pensioners,
seniors, the poor) are subject to a maximum of AU$5.40 (US$5.03).
To limit out-of-pocket costs for general and concessional benefi-
ciaries and their families, there is also a safety net threshold of
AU$1281.30 (US$1192.89) and AU$324.00 (US$301.64). Once out-of-
pocket costs reach these amounts in a calendar year, beneficiaries
are able to apply for reduced copayments through the Safety Net
Entitlement. Under this scheme, copayments are reduced to a
maximum of AU$5.40 for general beneficiaries and eliminated for
concessional beneficiaries.
Drugs approved by the TGA, but not subsidized by the PBS, are
also available to beneficiaries through the private market, which
represents approximately 11% of all prescriptions dispensed an-
nually. Prices are not subject to PBS pricing mechanisms [19]. Costs
for these drugs are either paid out-of-pocket by the patient or
through private health insurance.
Methods
Our study examines access to medicines by insured individuals.
We are aware of the special issues confronting the uninsured, but
they are beyond the scope of this study. Recognizing “access” as a
multidimensional concept, we operationalize it to include three
subdimensions: market availability, including regulatory approval
and time to reimbursement; insurer coverage and conditions of
reimbursement; and patient out-of-pocket costs [6]. To conduct a
like-with-like comparison, we strictly considered publicly insured
beneficiaries in both countries. The US population that we looked
at was Medicare beneficiaries. Our decision to examine Medicare
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First, Medicare covers 56% of cancer patients in the US [20]. Sec-
ond, Medicare Parts B and D drug coverage data sets are publicly
available and nationally representative. Third, Medicare coverage
policies often drive coverage decisions for private payers [21].
Availability
We began by identifying all therapeutic new molecular entities
(NMEs) and biologics approved by the US FDA between 2000 and
2009 for cancer indications [22]. Chemotherapeutic agents and
ormonal treatments were excluded. Subsequently, we searched
he Australian Register of Therapeutic Goods (ARTG) for each US
pproved product using the active ingredient and brand name as
earch terms [23]. The ARTG is an online database containing all
roducts approved by the TGA. Although many of these medicines
ave been approved for more than one indication, we only used
he initial indication approved by the US FDA for our analysis.
Prices
Because our focus is on Medicare, our comparison looked at those
prices used in Medicare Parts B and D in addition to a commonly
used reference price (average wholesale price [AWP]), although we
acknowledge that there are other sets of prices in the US that vary
from these three [24]:
● AWP [25]. Often referred to as the “sticker price,” these are the
manufacturer-suggested prices that wholesalers charge phar-
macies and other retailers. Although not directly used in deter-
mining prices in Medicare, it is nonetheless a widely used, al-
beit imperfect, benchmark for prescription drug prices [24].
● Average sales price (ASP) [26]. The ASP reflects the average
sales price charged by manufacturers to all private purchasers
inclusive of rebates and other discounts. Medicare Part B pays
the ASP plus 6% for drugs administered by a physician in an
outpatient setting. These prices, from April 2010, apply to 10 of
the drugs included on the final list.
● Medicare Part D [27]. Prescription drug plans (PDPs) providing pre-
scription drug coverage to seniors through Medicare Part D report
to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) the
prices of prescription drugs paid to retail pharmacies. Because
prices vary by PDP, we included the lowest published retail phar-
macy price among the top 10 PDPs in terms of lives covered in
2008 offering plans in Massachusetts [28]. Prices are from April 30,
2010, and comprise only products that are self-administered.
Australian prices were extracted from the May 2010 edition of
the Schedule of Benefits published by the Department of Health
and Ageing [29]. We converted all prices to US dollars using the
April 30, 2010, mid-market rate (AU$1.000  US$0.931) and the
2005 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
gross domestic product purchasing power parity benchmark (US
1.0, AU  1.39) [30,31].
We compared prices between countries on a price-per-dose basis.
These were calculated according to the largest dose strength and
corresponding package size available in both countries.
Coverage
For the purpose of comparing coverage of oncology drugs, we only
considered the subset of products licensed in both countries.
The Medicare Part B drug benefit is administered by regional
Medicare contractors, which do not subject Part B drugs to a for-
mulary per se. This said, carriers at the regional level may tag
certain Part B drugs with local coverage determinations (LCDs) as
well as related policy articles. At the national level, the CMS may
assign a national coverage determination to a Medicare Part B
drug. Therefore, to fully evaluate coverage of Medicare Part Bdrugs, we searched the CMS coverage database, which contains a
searchable archive of active Medicare carriers and Part B admin-
istrative contractors (MACs) that issue coverage determinations
that specify the conditions under which a product or service is
deemed “reasonable and necessary” for coverage [32].
For each drug, we used the brand and generic names (e.g., ima-
tinib mesylate and Gleevec) as keywords to search the database.
We counted each uniquely numbered LCD issued by carriers and
Part B MACs. In some cases, contractors issued a single, broadly
defined LCD and related policy articles that refined coverage for an
individual product or service. We found six instances of this in the
database and counted each as a single LCD. All LCDs were exam-
ined for specific coverage restrictions such as indication restric-
tions, quantity limits, and step therapy.
Part D coverage was assessed by examining formulary place-
ment, cost sharing, and coverage restrictions with respect to each
drug by the top 10 PDPs. Seven of the formularies that we examined
were those with the highest Medicare beneficiary enrollment: a
three-tier formulary, augmented by a fourth specialty tier used pri-
marily for biotechnology or injectable drugs that often cost more
than $500 per month per member. Two of the remaining three for-
mularies had three tiers, whereas the other had five. Information for
eight PDPs was obtained from the Medicare Prescription Drug Plan
finder in the zip code 02111 (Boston, Massachusetts). The remaining
two PDPs were not offered in Massachusetts, in which case, formu-
laries were accessed directly from each plan’s Web site.
We used the Schedule of Benefits and the PBS Web site to exam-
ine coverage, cost sharing, and reimbursement restrictions in Aus-
tralia. Regarding the latter, we documented the number and types of
rules governing the initiation and/or continuation of use of each
drug.
We also calculated delays between regulatory approval and
reimbursement in Australia. Here, two periods together comprise
the total time from TGA approval to reimbursement. First, we cal-
culated the number of months between TGA approval and the
PBAC recommendation. Based on its assessment, the PBAC can
either recommend, refuse to recommend, or defer a decision on a
drug. Thus, we examined past PBAC recommendations to deter-
mine the date that a drug was recommended for the first indica-
tion approved by the US FDA [33]. The second period that we mea-
sured was the time between PBAC recommendation and listing in
the PBS. Here, we used previous editions of the PBS to locate the
date that a drug was first listed for the comparison indication.
For the US, we examined potential delays in full reimburse-
ment, as a result of a lag between US FDA approval and final billing
and reimbursement code determination. There often is a delay
between US FDA approval and assignment of a definitive Health
Care Procedure Coding System J code to each drug [34]. Such codes
facilitate and ensure proper billing and payment.
Once a drug is approved by the US FDA, the CMS must decide
whether a programmatic need exists to justify establishing a code.
No specific timeframe exists between marketing approval and de-
finitive coding. Delays between approval and reimbursement cod-
ing usually do not lead to an actual delay in reimbursement. This
is because during the phase when a specific reimbursement code
is not available, carriers typically use a nonspecific temporary
code for billing and reimbursement purposes. This said, tempo-
rary coding can lead to confusion on the part of providers, for
example, with respect to the size and number of vials reimbursed
or the fact that multiple drugs may be assigned the same code.
Results
Availability
Between 2000 and 2009, the US FDA approved 34 NMEs and biolog-
ics for the treatment of cancer. Of these, 19 (56%) were approved by
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corresponding dates of approval. A full list of all US FDA approvals
is provided in the Supplemental Materials found at doi:10.1016/
j.val.2011.05.004.
Price
Table 2 shows a comparison of US and Australian prices for the 19
products licensed in both countries. Overall, intra-US prices varied
widely, with the AWP being the highest for most drugs. For four
drugs, Part D prices were the same or slightly higher than the AWP.
On average, the AWP was higher than the ASP and Part D by 11%
and 3%, respectively.
On average, Australian prices were lower than US prices:
36%, 41%, and 24% lower than AWP, ASP, and Part D, respec-
tively. Only one drug— gefitinib—was priced higher in Australia,
in fact, 54% higher than the average US price. The greatest price
differential was observed with oxaliplatin, where the price was
79% lower in Australia compared with the AWP. Here, the large
difference is likely accounted for by the availability in Australia of
several generic alternatives listed in the PBS alongside the
branded version.
Coverage
A comparison of coverage differences between countries, broken
down by percentage of drugs covered, level of cost sharing, and
coverage restrictions, is given in Table 3. Due to the split in cover-
age between Medicare Parts B and D, we distinguish coverage be-
tween the 10 physician-administered and 9 self-administered
drugs.
In Australia, the PBS listed 12 (63%) of the 19 TGA-approved
NMEs and biologics targeting cancer in the Schedule of Benefits for
the indications examined; five were physician and seven were self
administered. All 12 listed products were designated as authority
required. Of these, six had initiation requirements placed on them
that were more restrictive than the TGA labeling, whereas nine
were assigned continuation rules based on proof of treatment re-
sponse. Furthermore, seven required step therapy, and bevaci-
Table 1 – Oncology NMEs approved in the United States
and Australia.
Drug name (brand) USFDA
approval
TGA
approval
Arsenic trioxide (Trisenox) 9/25/2000 5/13/2009
Imatinib mesylate (Gleevec) 5/10/2001 8/13/2001
Oxaliplatin (Eloxatin) 8/9/2002 2/27/2001
Fulvestrant (Faslodex) 4/25/2002 3/6/2006
Gefitinib (Iressa) 5/5/2003 4/28/2003
Bortezomib (Velcade) 5/13/2003 2/14/2006
Pemetrexed (Alimta) 2/4/2004 6/30/2004
Erlotinib (Tarceva) 11/18/2004 1/30/2006
Sorafenib (Nexavar) 12/20/2005 9/27/2006
Dasatinib (Sprycel) 6/28/2006 1/15/2007
Sunitinib (Sutent) 1/26/2006 9/14/2006
Nilotinib (Tasigna) 10/29/2007 1/17/2008
Temsirolimus (Torisel) 5/30/2007 6/4/2008
Lapatinib (Tykerb) 3/13/2007 6/28/2007
Alemtuzumab (Campath) 5/7/2001 5/10/2006
Bevacizumab (Avastin) 2/26/2004 2/24/2005
Cetuximab (Erbitux) 2/12/2004 9/25/2007
Panitumumab (Vectibix) 9/27/2006 5/14/2008
Everolimus (Afinitor) 3/30/2009 6/8/2009
NMEs, new molecular entities; TGA, Therapeutic Goods Adminis-
tration; USFDA, U.S. Food and Drug Administration.zumab was the only drug not subject to quantity limits. PatientT D (b A Im O F G B P E S D S N T L A B C P E A
948 V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 4 ( 2 0 1 1 ) 9 4 4 – 9 5 2cost sharing ranged from zero for concessional beneficiaries to a
maximum of AU$33.30 per prescription.
For the US Medicare population, no Part B drugs were denied
coverage. There was, however, a total of 22 LCDs and policy arti-
cles issued for nine of the 10 drugs. Of these, two referred to poli-
cies on uses related to nononcologic indications. The remaining 20
LCDs clarified the types of on- and off-label indications covered by
the carrier or MAC. The CMS issued one national coverage deter-
mination that applies to all Medicare Part B carriers and contactors
granting coverage of oxaliplatin, cetuximab, and bevacizumab and
related treatment costs for certain off-label indications among pa-
tients enrolled in CMS-identified clinical trials.
Within Medicare Part D, the PDPs covered 93% of the drugs.
Eight of the nine drugs were listed on the highest cost-sharing tier
for all 10 plans. The remaining drug, gefitinib, was denied coverage
by six plans. Among the four plans that included it in the formu-
lary, three placed it in the highest cost-sharing tier. Only two PDPs
required step therapy, applying it to two drugs. All 10 plans re-
quired prior authorization for at least one drug, with eight plans
requiring prior authorization for at least six drugs. Six plans
tagged at least one product with quantity limits.
Co-insurance was the sole method of cost sharing for both Part
B and Part D drugs. A 20% co-insurance was applied to all physi-
cian-administered (Part B) drugs [35]. Percentages ranged between
25% and 50% regardless of tier placement for self-administered
drugs (Part D). In both instances, the combination of high prices
and rates of co-insurance translates into significant out-of-pocket
costs. To illustrate, a 50% co-insurance rate on the lowest pub-
lished Part D PDP 30-day prescription price for imatinib mesylate
(US$4328) implies an out-of-pocket cost to the patient of
US$2164. In addition, there were differences in Parts B and D in
terms of maximum out-of-pocket costs. Although these are not
capped for Part B beneficiaries, out-of-pocket costs for Part D en-
rollees are set according to the thresholds outlined by the defined
standard benefit. In 2009, the standard benefit included a US$295
deductible, followed by co-insurance of 25% up to the initial cov-
erage limit of $896.25 in annual out-of-pocket costs ($2700 in total
expenses). After the initial coverage limit was reached, 100% of
costs were paid by the beneficiary (the so-called donut hole) until
the catastrophic threshold was reached at $4350 ($6153.75 in total
expenses), at which point, a co-insurance rate of 5% was applied
[36]. Subsidies are also available on a sliding income scale to low-
income individuals, including those who qualify for Medicaid (i.e.,
dual eligibles). In some instances, benefits provided to low-income
Table 3 – Coverage, cost sharing, and coverage
restrictions of cancer drugs in the United States and
Australia.
% Covered Cost
sharing*
Coverage
restrictions,
%
PA QL ST
Physician administered
(n  10)
US 100 20% 0 0 0
Australia 50 US$31.00 100 90 0
Self-administered
(n  9)
US 93 25%-50% 70 41 4
Australia 78 US$31.00 100 100 78
PA, prior authorization; QL, quantity limits; ST, step therapy; US,
United States.
* Per prescription.beneficiaries in Part B may eliminate all cost sharing, whereas PartD enrollees may have their cost sharing waived or be subject to
substantially reduced copayments of between $1.10 and $6.00 per
prescription per month.
In Table 4, we show that the institutional requirements to gain
PBS listing in Australia can result in substantial delays. For some
drugs, the time between TGA approval and PBAC recommendation
was the most significant cause of delays in access. Although the
average was 15.8 months, there was a wide range across the sam-
ple. Imatinib mesylate was recommended just 1 month after ap-
proval, whereas decisions on pemetrexed and bevacizumab took
as long as 43 months. There were several reasons for such long
delays. Some, such as that for bevacizumab, were the result of
companies postponing application to the PBAC. In this case, the
drug was approved by the TGA in February 2005, but did not re-
ceive its first decision from the PBAC (refusal to recommend) until
March 2008. On the other hand, some drugs had difficulty in se-
curing recommendation despite promptly submitted applications.
For example, pemetrexed received a deferral from the PBAC just 5
months after approval. However, until its recommendation in No-
vember 2007, it was issued two refusals.
After PBAC recommendation, the delay in PBS listing was
shorter, averaging 5.3 months. The total time between TGA ap-
proval and PBS listing varied greatly, with fewer than 12 months
elapsing for four drugs, two drugs having a 1- to 2-year lag, and
three drugs with a more than 3-year delay. Overall, the average
total delay between regulatory approval and PBS listing was 23.8
months. There was a total of seven drugs that had yet to be rec-
ommended by the PBAC despite TGA approval. Five of these had
been submitted for review but were denied listing and the other
two had yet to be submitted. Finally, two drugs obtained listing in
the Schedule of Benefits for indications other than those included
in our analysis.
In the US, there was an average interval of 16.3 months be-
tween US FDA approval and coding for Medicare Part B drugs. This
is not to say that there was an actual delay in market access after
US FDA approval. Rather, before the assignment of a permanent J
code, the CMS assigns a less specific temporary code. Although this
allows billing and reimbursement of the drug over the interim, there
can be a lack of clarity on what is being reimbursed (i.e., specific
doses), which may result in uneven uptake during this period.
Discussion
We assessed patient access to newly approved oncology drugs in
the US and Australia in terms of marketing availability, coverage,
and patient out-of-pocket costs. These drugs represent a special
case, mainly because of their high cost, but also the general per-
ception that many only offer modest benefits. This poses a chal-
lenge to payers worldwide, public and private, who need to bal-
ance patient access and cost containment.
A stated goal of the Australian PBS is to “provide timely access
to the medicines that Australians need, at a cost individuals and
the community can afford” [37]. Our analysis suggests mixed re-
sults. Prices and beneficiary out-of-pocket costs are lower. The
maximum copayment of AU$33.30 under the PBS averages to just
1% of the PBS listed price. The safety net for general and conces-
sional beneficiaries alike further limits total out-of-pocket costs
for beneficiaries. This contrasts sharply with the US where co-
insurance rates per treatment cycle or prescription for enrollees
not qualifying for a low-income subsidy are as high as 50%, and
maximum out-of-pocket costs can potentially exceed US$4350 an-
nually. On the other hand, the “fourth hurdle” in Australia is re-
stricting product availability and coverage, in addition to prolong-
ing the time between regulatory approval and reimbursement.
Taking into account the fact that the TGA approved less than 60%
of the NMEs and biologics between 2000 and 2009 compared to the
US and the PBS covered just more than 60% of TGA-approved prod-
Table 4 – Time delay between regulatory approval and reimbursement.
Drug generic name
(brand name)
US medicare part B Australia PBS Delay (mo)
USFDA
approval
HCPCS J code
added
TGA
approval
Recommended
by PBAC
PBS listing Total
US
Aus TGA
approval to
PBAC rec.
Aus PBAC
recommendation
for PBS listing
Total
Aus
Arsenic trioxide (Trisenox) 9/25/2000 11/1/2002 2/6/2009 3/1/2009 8/1/2009 16 1 5 6
Imatinib mesylate (Gleevec) 5/10/2001 — 8/13/2001 9/1/2001 —* — 1 — —
Oxaliplatin (Eloxatin) 8/9/2002 1/1/2004 2/27/2001 6/1/2001 —* 17 4 — —
Fulvestrant (Faslodex) 4/25/2002 1/1/2004 3/6/2006 —† — 21 — — —
Gefitinib (Iressa) 5/5/2003 — 4/28/2003 7/1/2004 12/1/2004 — 15 5 20
Bortezomib (Velcade) 5/13/2003 1/1/2005 2/14/2006 7/1/2007 11/1/2007 20 17 4 21
Pemetrexed (Alimta) 2/4/2004 1/1/2005 6/30/2004 11/1/2007 1/1/2008 11 41 2 43
Erlotinib (Tarceva) 11/18/2004 — 1/30/2006 3/1/2008 8/1/2008 — 26 5 31
Sorafenib (Nexavar) 12/20/2005 — 9/27/2006 —‡ —† — — — —
Dasatinib (Sprycel) 6/28/2006 — 1/15/2007 3/1/2007 8/1/2007 — 2 5 7
Sunitinib (Sutent) 1/26/2006 — 9/14/2006 7/1/2009 12/1/2009 — 34 5 39
Nilotinib (Tasigna) 10/29/2007 — 1/17/2008 3/1/2008 8/1/2008 — 2 5 7
Temsirolimus (Torisel) 5/30/2007 1/1/2009 6/4/2008 —‡ — 20 — — —
Lapatinib (Tykerb) 3/13/2007 — 6/28/2007 12/1/2007 5/1/2008 — 6 5 11
Alemtuzumab (Campath) 5/7/2001 1/1/2009 5/10/2006 —† — 20 — — —
Bevacizumab (Avastin) 2/26/2004 1/1/2005 2/24/2005 7/1/2008 7/1/2009 11 41 12 53
Cetuximab (Erbitux) 2/12/2004 1/1/2005 9/25/2007 —‡ —§ 11 — — —
Panitumumab (Vectibix) 9/27/2006 1/1/2008 5/14/2008 —‡ — 16 — — —
Everolimus (Afinitor) 3/30/2009 — 6/08/2009 —‡ — — — — —
Aus, Australia; HCPCS, Health Care Procedure Coding System; TGA, Therapeutic Good Administration; PBAC, PBS, Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme; US, United States; USFDA, U.S. Food and Drug
Administration.
* Unable to verify listing date due to unavailability of PBS editions before August 2003.
† Drug has not been reviewed by the PBAC.
‡ PBAC recommendation has been refused for the initial FDA-approved indication.
§ Listed in Schedule of Benefits for indications not included in the analysis.
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attained PBS coverage, after an average delay of more than 23
months.
It has been suggested that the PBS operates as a means of pur-
chasing outcomes [15]. Although this statement would require
corroborative evidence to be validated, it underscores that final
determinations about price, copayment level, and restrictions on
coverage reflect the intent on the part of the Australian reimburse-
ment authority to institute a systematic, transparent, outcomes-
based approach to optimizing clinical and cost-effectiveness given
a fixed set of health-care resources.
By contrast, drug reimbursement decisions in the US appear
less evidence and outcomes based and not necessarily guided by
clinical (and cost) effectiveness considerations [38]. Perhaps this
has contributed to relatively few limits on oncology drug coverage
in the US. Indeed, at least for the Medicare population, there is a
high percentage of covered oncology drugs. Although less strin-
gent evidence-based reimbursement criteria account for a rela-
tively high percentage of covered drugs, numerous legal require-
ments also play a role. For physician-administered drugs,
Medicare Part B carriers/MACs are required by law to include can-
cer drugs that have received what is described as a “medically
accepted indication.” This is often interpreted liberally to include
uses approved by the US FDA as well as off-label uses reported in
peer-reviewed journals and officially recognized compendia [39].
For self-administered Part D oncology drugs, the CMS protected
drug class regulations apply; that is, Part D plans must include on
their formularies “all or substantially all” USFDA-approved drugs
in the antineoplastics class.
Because information on product submissions and denials for
market authorization was unavailable, one aspect of market avail-
ability that remains unknown is why less than 60% of the drugs in
our data set were approved by the TGA. Similar to the USFDA, the
TGA is mandated to assess safety, efficacy, and quality at stan-
dards equal to those of comparable countries [40]. Therefore, strin-
gency of regulatory approval can more or less be ruled out as a
factor. However, it could be that sponsor companies are unwilling
to market certain products in Australia, knowing the hurdles that
they face post-approval to obtain coverage by the PBS. In this re-
spect, the PBAC may act as a deterrent to submissions for market-
ing authorization, although hard evidence is inconclusive [9].
The key barriers to access in Australia appear to be marketing
availability and coverage, whereas the key barrier to access in the
US is patient out-of-pocket costs, i.e., ability to pay. Our results
raise the question of whether speedier access to virtually all new
cancer treatments in the US at the expense of higher prices and
patient out-of-pocket costs is justified in terms of outcomes.
Early work suggests the Australia system has been able to op-
erate with lower prices [41] and limits on access without compro-
ising health outcomes [42,43]. The most recent data available
rom the 1990s and early 2000s indicates comparable survival for
reast, colon, and prostate cancer for patients in the US and Aus-
ralia [43]. Of course, there is much uncertainty about the precise
ole access to cancer drugs plays in determining survival. Clearly,
urvival outcomes are a function of other factors as well, such as
arly detection. Although beyond the scope of this study, future
esearch could begin to examine the influence that each of these
actors has on patient-level outcomes.
Of note are differences in coverage of off-label uses, mentioned
reviously. Off-label prescribing is common in the US. According
o a report published by the National Comprehensive Cancer Net-
ork, 50% to 75% of all uses of anticancer drugs in the US are
ff-label [44]. Furthermore, the number of medically accepted off-
abel uses for some oncology therapeutics outnumbers those that
re approved [45]. Coverage under Medicare Part B is statutorily
efined in Section 1861 (t)(1) and (2) of the Social Security Act, soong as the use is deemed “medically accepted,” i.e., listed in offi-cially recognized compendia or supported in the peer-reviewed
literature. Additionally, 39 states require payment for off-label
uses of USFDA approved drugs by Employment Retirement Secu-
rity Act plans.
Detailed evidence is unavailable regarding the prescribing of
off-label oncology drugs in Australia. The PBAC has not estab-
lished formal policies, although the automatic use of prior autho-
rization for all covered products as well as PBAC’s authority to
track physician prescribing and request justification for prescrip-
tions made outside PBS restrictions suggests the unapproved use
of oncology drugs is strongly discouraged [46].
Such restrictions may impede access to certain beneficial off-
label uses of cancer drugs. In the US, although payers commonly
impose coverage restrictions, few actually exclude off-label reim-
bursement, and many practitioners view off-label prescribing as
an important avenue for advancing clinical practice [47]. Given
that many cancer drugs have evidence to support their off-label
use, strict limitations to only approved indications may deny ac-
cess to important treatment alternatives.
In the US, some politicians and policymakers have expressed
concern that explicit use of comparative (cost) effectiveness may
impede patient access by reducing therapeutic options [48,49].
There is also ambivalence among patients and providers about
explicit priority setting. The fear exists that by circumscribing pre-
scribing decisions, CER would trump patient preferences and phy-
sician autonomy. The current method of seemingly “muddling
through elegantly” [50], however, appears incapable of striking a
fiscally sustainable balance between cost and access, particularly
with respect to cancer drugs. Like Australia, spending on cancer
treatments in the US continues to grow at double-digit rates,
which has led to a squeezing of payer and patient budgets [51].
This is having an immediate impact on who gets treated and who
does not. To illustrate, a recent survey of medical oncologists in-
dicates that aggregate drug spending and patient out-of-pocket
expenses are influencing prescribing decisions, which leads to
haphazard resource allocation decisions and concomitant inequi-
ties across the population of cancer patients [52]. In the absence of
establishing a systematic evidence base for the coverage decision-
making process, the patchwork of current decision tools may
prove inadequate for controlling costs, improving outcomes, and
reducing inequities.
Should the US decide to embark on a path toward more sys-
tematic use of CER, there are formidable challenges inherent to the
US system that will need to be addressed, among which are
● Payer fragmentation: The diffuse system of public and private
payers and differences in the size and scope of benefits pro-
vided (e.g., medical vs. pharmacy benefits) will likely make the
uptake of comparative (cost) effectiveness evidence segmented
and uneven.
● Existing evidence base: The existing evidence base used by
policymakers is primarily generated by randomized, controlled
trials (RCTs), often fraught with methodological issues and lim-
itations [53,54].
To address payer fragmentation, there is room for building a
more systematic and better coordinated infrastructure for sharing
evidence in the US. The immediate goal should not necessarily be
to eliminate disparities in payer coverage policies or erect new
barriers to access, but instead encourage a more informed process
of decision making by closing the gap between what we know and
what we do in pharmaceutical care. Accordingly, CER could assist
in this effort, for instance, by establishing a clearinghouse for sys-
tematic reviews conducted by multiple evidence-based practice
centers, each uniquely suited to different constituencies [55].
Integral to this endeavor will be augmenting the existing evi-
dence base by incorporating multiple methods of research, includ-
ing observational studies. RCTs are designed to evaluate which
(951V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 4 ( 2 0 1 1 ) 9 4 4 – 9 5 2intervention works best within a carefully controlled sample and
setting against a placebo. Observational studies, on the other
hand, examine more complex care settings and include broad or
vulnerable patient populations over a longer follow-up period.
This underscores the intent of CER: to identify which interventions
work best in typical patient-care settings for a wide range of pa-
tients.
Recent federal efforts to stimulate CER, including $1.1 billion
allocated by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and the
Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute established under
the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, may usher in a
more systematic means of collecting and disseminating research
findings on drugs’ clinical (and cost) effectiveness. As a result, this
may lead to a more evidence-based system of resource allocation.
Given the importance that Americans generally attach to plural-
ism and choice, however, such an evidence-based system would
have to be tailored to meet local circumstances and preferences.
This, in turn, implies that variation in prescribing patterns as well
as differences in terms of payer reimbursement would persist.
Conclusion
In neither Australia nor the US do all patients who might benefit
from cancer drugs necessarily have access to them. This is be-
cause no health-care system can provide every medical interven-
tion that offers benefits to everyone. Hence, every system must
confront the question of how and on what basis to deny poten-
tially beneficial care to some people, at least some of the time.
The Australian system makes reimbursement decisions using
an explicitly evidence-based approach, whereas evidence in the
US is used on an ad hoc basis. The key barriers to access in Aus-
tralia are marketing availability and coverage, whereas the key
barrier to access in the US is patient out-of-pocket costs, i.e., ability
to pay. Our analysis points to a possible trade-off in market access
to oncology drugs. Although more oncology drugs are available in
the US and a higher percentage of those drugs are covered, the
evidence-based approach adopted by Australia is associated with
lower prices, thereby improving affordability for payers and pa-
tients for those medications deemed cost-effective by the reim-
bursement authority.
Given that the number of expensive cancer drugs with modest
benefits is increasing, reimbursement will continue to be a key
challenge for decision makers in all health-care systems. On this
point, while keeping in mind significant philosophical differences
between health-care systems, policymakers may be well served by
cautiously drawing lessons from the experiences, both positive
and negative, of systems that have already integrated economic
evaluations into decision making [42]. In the case of Australia, for
example, the use of CER has not been universally accepted be-
cause it has resulted in restrictions in access that have generated
considerable controversy [56]. Nonetheless, the PBS is able to
make hard choices regarding cancer drug reimbursement, balanc-
ing multiple, sometimes competing, objectives such as efficient
priority setting and equitable distribution of resources, without
compromising overall survival outcomes.
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